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Book Review

Paving the Way to Religious Acceptance
Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical
History of the Separation of Church and State
by Stephen M. Feldman
New York University Press (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
America has long been known as a “melting pot,” referring
to the diversity found within American culture. Nowhere is this
diversity more evident than in the many different religions
Americans profess. Undoubtedly, religion can play a large part
in any person’s life; religious views help shape a believer’s selfidentity and the way he views the world around him. As a result, society—and to a large extent, the law, which is shaped by
society—is viewed and formed through the prism of the various
religious perspectives present in America. Stephen Feldman’s
book, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas,1 is a good start
to awakening the conscience—to seeing the law and its progeny
from various religious perspectives. However, Feldman’s inability to view the problem from a perspective other than his own
undermines his potentially significant contribution.
Feldman argues that the Christian majority in America has
condemned “the Jews,” the “prototypical religious outgroup” or
religious “other,” and thereby deprived them of their religious
freedom.2 Central to American Christianity, according to Feldman, is the opposition of Jewish carnality and Christian spirituality: “the New Testament emphasized a dualism” by
“characteriz[ing] and revil[ing] the Jews as carnal, while Christians were revered as spiritual.”3 Feldman concludes that this

1. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS (1997).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 14.
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central tenet has, in turn, been the basis for the development of
an anti-Semitic church and state jurisprudence in America.4
Based on this conclusion, Feldman argues that religion should
be eliminated from the American social and political arenas.5
This Book Review critiques Feldman’s thesis from the perspective of a Mormon Christian, recognizing that Mormonism
is a distinct and minority denomination within Feldman’s generalization of a Christian America. Not only are Feldman’s
generalizations unfair, they are offensive to those Christians
who are not considered part of the Christian majority. In effect,
through his narrative, Feldman personifies what he so despises
in the status of religion in America: the intolerance of the
“other.” Instead of completely eliminating religious discussion
or belief from the political sphere, as Feldman urges, I argue
that the recent Supreme Court trend of government neutrality
towards religion is a better proposal. By treating religion or
nonreligion in a neutral matter, neither endorsing nor disfavoring one over the other, Americans can more readily enjoy the
inalienable right of their freedom to worship according to their
conscience, whatever that may personally mean.
II. FELDMAN’S DOMINANT STORY OF THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE
Feldman begins his critical social narrative by instructing
his reader that “nearly all discussions of the religion clauses
build upon one dominant or standard story of the separation of
church and state.”6 Feldman believes that this almost universally accepted story is the assumption “that at some point in
the history of the United States, religious freedom and equality
triumphed over persecution, oppression, and injustice.”7
According to the author, this dominant story, which has
been perpetuated since the founding of the United States,
stands on two faulty propositions. The first proposition is the
popular belief that the separation of church and state doctrine
equally protects the religious majority and minority.8 Feldman
argues that rather than creating religious equality, the separa-

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 7.
See id. at 286.
Id. at 4.
Id.
See id.
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tion principle has largely permitted the majority religion in
America—Christianity—to develop a hegemonic hold over both
American political and social discourse. As a result, religious
“outgroups,”9 namely Judaism, suffer at the hands of a powerful majority.
Feldman’s second erroneous proposition is that this principle of separation, which many mistakenly believe arose for the
first time in the American experience, created religious freedom and equality for the oppressed.10 Feldman argues that “the
dominant story appears in different guises only because writers
disagree about when (and not whether) religious liberty ascended to victory.”11 Thus, scholars fail to consider whether
religious freedom has truly triumphed over persecution and
inequality, thereby rendering their subsequent analyses incomplete. According to Feldman, these two faulty propositions
work together to reinforce American Christianity’s hegemonic
hold over all other religious outgroups.
After describing these two flaws of the dominant story of
church and state, Feldman sets out to dispel the theories by
explaining the “development of Christian social power vis-à-vis
the state and religious outgroups.”12 Feldman begins his analysis with the emergence of Christianity in Israel, contending
that the New Testament “decidedly condemned (and still condemns) Judaism as a religion and Jews as a people.”13 The author then traces the interplay between Christianity and the
state throughout history, culminating in his discussion of modern Supreme Court cases.14 While the Court, legal scholars, and
historians praise the Court’s decisions for “fulfill[ing] the
American principle of religious liberty,”15 Feldman contests this
viewpoint. Instead, Feldman asserts that the Court “conceptualizes religion in distinctly Christian terms,”16 and by so doing,
continues to relegate America’s religious outgroups to the
realm of “other.”
9. Throughout Feldman’s work, the author refers to non-Christian religions as
“religious outgroups.” In keeping with Feldman’s vocabulary, this Book Review will
also use “religious outgroups” to refer to non-Christian and minority religions.
10. See FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10.
14. See id. at 246.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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III. CRITIQUE THROUGH A MORMON CHRISTIAN’S PERSPECTIVE
A. Is Christianity Truly Based on Anti-Semitic Rhetoric?
To be sure, providing a brief synopsis of the separation of
church and state is an overwhelming feat, and Feldman makes
a good attempt at synthesizing history, political theory, philosophy, theology, and sociology. However noble Feldman’s intentions, he largely undermines his work’s validity by continually, and at times somewhat tediously, premising a historical
analysis on his belief that Christianity is based on anti-Semitic
sentiments. “[T]he peculiar condemnation of ‘the Jews,’ ” he
claims, “not only has been the root source of antisemitism but
also has been enormously important to the development of
Christianity and the state.”17
Furthermore, Feldman fails to account for the seemingly
anti-Semitic language found replete throughout the Old Testament. The Old Testament traces the history of the Jewish
people, describing their fall from grace when Adam and Eve
first partook of the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden,18 and
man’s subsequent experiences and offerings in the carnal
world. One would be hard-pressed to turn more than five pages
in any version of the Old Testament and not find an angry God
or ancient prophet chastising the people for their wickedness
and inherently evil nature.19
Admittedly, the New Testament is different from the Old
Testament in that it recounts a history of the Christians in addition to the Jews. However, both Testaments contain what
could be characterized as anti-Semitic rhetoric. When the language of the two Testaments is compared, Feldman’s argument
that the New Testament is uniquely anti-Semitic loses much of
its luster because similar negative passages can be found in
both Testaments. For example, from the very first book of the
Old Testament, man is described as carnal and evil: “And God
saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and
that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only

17. Id. at 7.
18. See Genesis 3:1-24 (King James).
19. See, e.g., Genesis 8:21 (King James) (stating that the “imagination of man’s
heart is evil”); 2 Kings 17:17 (King James) (observing that the people “sold themselves
to do evil”); Isaiah 59:7 (King James) (commenting that “man’s feet run to evil”).
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evil continually.”20 A similar statement, referring to man’s inherently evil nature, can be found in the New Testament: “For
from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts,
adulteries, fornications, murders, [t]hefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride,
foolishness: All these evil things come from within, and defile
the man.”21 Importantly, this passage speaks of all men—not
just the Jews in particular, as Feldman would propose.
By relentlessly reiterating his theme of the anti-Semitic basis of Christianity, Feldman robs his arguments of much of
their force. There is no question that when various religious beliefs are posed against one another, differences in doctrine and
interpretation emerge. Because of this, it is frustrating and
unproductive to debate the merits of one’s religious beliefs by
merely repeatedly dismissing the beliefs of another. For example, irrespective of the number of times Feldman reiterates his
belief that Christianity is based on anti-Semitic rhetoric, he
will hardly convince his Christian reader of this fact. Rather,
Feldman’s resentment resonates throughout the work, causing
his reader to distrust the validity and objectivity of his academic assertions. Further, it is questionable for Feldman to assume he knows what is taught in each Christian sect.
B. A Missing Solution
This presumption that Feldman knows and understands
the teachings of the various sects within the Christian religion
underscores an even larger problem with his analysis: after
chronicling the infinite instances of Jewish subjugation at the
hands of the Christian majority, Feldman fails to provide any
realistic solutions to rectify the problems he sees in the dominant story of the separation of church and state. Instead of offering solutions, Feldman’s book demonstrates that as the religious “other,” he is not willing to reach a compromise with the
religious majority.
For example, in the concluding section of his book, entitled
“Final Thoughts: A Political Statement,” Feldman chronicles
examples of “attitudes and actions toward Jews”22 that demonstrate his assertion of the consistent intrusion of Christian be20. Genesis 6:5 (King James).
21. Mark 7:21-23 (King James).
22. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 282.
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liefs and ideals on religious outgroups. This list of examples of
Christian domination is helpful in demonstrating how pervasive Christian attitudes are in American society. For example,
Feldman notes that when his daughter, who is Jewish, wanted
to order a Thanksgiving book from a scholastic book club, she
could not do so without ordering a Christmas book as well.23
Seemingly innocuous examples such as this highlight the validity of portions of Feldman’s assertions.
While Feldman’s examples of daily Christian domination
are poignant, he goes too far in proposing a complete divorce
from religion in the social context. Rather than propounding a
workable compromise, Feldman reasons that references to religion should be eliminated from all social discourse. For example, Feldman encourages his readers not to wish one another a
“Merry Christmas,” because doing so only further promotes the
subjugation of the religious minority.24 This goal of completely
removing religious references from the public and social sector
is not only of questionable value but is unrealistic. The very nature of religious belief presupposes that religious values and
teachings will carry over into a follower’s daily activities. To
require a believer to keep his religious beliefs only in the realm
of “religion,” in effect, is to undermine many religionists’ ultimate goal of incorporating religious values and beliefs into
every aspect of their lives. Perhaps a better, more effective solution is to continue to pursue a neutral perspective vis-à-vis
religious and nonreligious groups, whether or not they compose
a majority or minority of the American population. By so doing,
Americans can properly claim their inalienable right to follow a
particular faith or to refrain from doing so altogether.
C. The Supreme Court and a Vision of Neutrality
A good place to start in establishing this neutrality is by
turning to the example of the United States Supreme Court. In
recent years, there has been a noticeable shift in the Court’s
church-state jurisprudence from accommodation to neutrality.25
23. See id. at 283.
24. See id. at 286.
25. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that establishing a separate school for Jewish handicapped children only was an unconstitutional
establishment of religion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) (holding that “[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise
and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ to-
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Ideally, a neutral perspective provides for “a government that
reflects interdenominational non-favoritism.”26 This shift to a
formal neutrality can effectively safeguard the balance of the
separation of church and state. Rather than requiring complete
elimination or total endorsement of religion in the public
sphere, a neutral perspective protects individual religious freedom while simultaneously preventing excessive government
entanglement in the religious arena.
Two main principles are involved in the Court’s recent neutral approach to church-state jurisprudence.27 First, government action will be considered neutral if it grants benefits,
such as tax exemptions, access to public facilities, and special
accommodations, even-handedly to all religions, large or
small.28 By so doing, the government does not favor or discriminate against any one religion. Second, religious activity
must be given the same treatment—no more, no less—than
non-religious activity.29 Thus, for example, in Rosenberger v.
Rector of the University of Virginia, the Supreme Court decided
under this neutral approach that the University of Virginia
had to subsidize a student publication that was religious and
evangelical in nature if the university subsidized all other student-run publications.30 The overriding theme of this neutral
approach is equality and parity, two concepts central to First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Under this definition of neutrality, there will be times
when, as a result of government legislation or judicial reasoning, religion will benefit at the expense of nonreligion, or a minority religion at the expense of the majority.31 However, the

ward religion”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (holding that an Arkansas statute making it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university
to teach about evolution was an unconstitutional establishment of religion); see also
Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 505 (1998); Christine A. Atkinson, Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties
Union—Permissible v. Impermissible Government Display of Religious Symbols: The
Trend Toward a Perspective of Neutrality, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 727 (1991);
Michal R. Belknap, God and the Warren Court: The Quest for “A Wholesome Neutrality,” 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 401 (1999).
26. Shivakumar, supra note 25, at 505.
27. See id. at 515.
28. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
29. See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995).
30. See id. at 845-46.
31. For example, see Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), where the Court held that a facially neutral, generally applicable law
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converse of both situations will also inevitably be true: a completely neutral perspective disregards religion and, therefore,
applies evenhandedly to all groups. Neutrality does not inherently mean that minority religions or nonreligious people will
be discriminated against. Rather, neutrality prevents the government from favoring one religion over another, or religion
over nonreligion—exactly what the First Amendment requires.
D. A Good Beginning
Feldman’s work has merit because it awakens the reader to
the discrimination that followers of non-Christian religions
(and minority sects within the Christian religion) encounter.
Precisely because religion can be so encompassing in every aspect of a believer’s life, whether it be morally, politically, culturally, or theologically, it is important to understand the
views of others. As Professor Balkin states:
If we do not investigate the relationship between our social
situation and our perspectives, we may confuse our conception of what is reasonable with Reason itself. If we do not see
how our reason is both enabled and limited by our position,
we may think our judgments positionless and universal. We
may find the perspectives of those differently situated unreasonable, bizarre, and even dangerous, or we may not even
recognize the possibility of another way of looking at things.32

Because of the undeniable tendency to make decisions and
form social policy in accordance with one’s own beliefs, there is
no question that the Christian majority in America often imposes its beliefs into the political system. The courts today, particularly the United States Supreme Court, need to protect and
defend minority religious groups against the majority’s usurpation of their rights. Feldman’s work begins to awaken readers
to the existence of these issues.
Despite the usefulness of this book as an awakening
mechanism, Feldman’s work can only be used in a limited
will pass constitutional muster even if it outlaws a central practice of a minority religion. The Native American use of peyote was at issue in Smith, and the Court held that
the defendants could not ignore neutral laws of general applicability, despite their
right of freedom of religious worship and, therefore, were not entitled to unemployment
benefits upon being fired for the use of peyote.
32. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L.J. 1935, 1952 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)).
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manner. Perhaps what is most unsettling about Feldman’s critique is that he largely views history and the development of
the separation of church and state from his perspective only. In
effect, he adopts the position that he criticizes throughout his
book. Rather than describing or analyzing the current state of
religious freedom in America from various perspectives, Feldman remains behind the lens of what he calls the religious
“outgroup.”
While the Christian majority needs to rethink its views regarding whether the Constitution truly protects the rights of
non-mainstream religionists, or those that do not follow any religion altogether, the minority religionists may also need to rethink their view of the Christian majority. Feldman’s attempt
to lump all Christian religions into the “majority” is an unfair
generalization that leads to inaccuracies. The assertion that
Christianity is based on anti-Semitic rhetoric is particularly
questionable. Further, by failing to view diversity within the
Christian religion itself, Feldman misses an important point:
religious diversity is not necessarily controlled by one majority
group. Rather, there are differences among the various Christian denominations, which ultimately view the separation of
church and state from a variety of perspectives. These differences, in turn, help prevent the government from favoring one
religion over another, or religion over nonreligion. By failing to
take these differences into account, Feldman demonstrates how
everyone, even followers of “outgroup” religions, needs to view
religion from the “other’s” perspective.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a society such as America, where differences in all aspects of life abound, it is more effective to recognize such differences than suppress them. Rather than divorcing religion from
all dialogue, including among believers of the same faith, we
should learn to embrace and protect all religions. Rather than
asking me not to wish a fellow Christian a “Merry Christmas,”
we should address, respect, and protect religious differences,
whether they are found in religious “outgroups” or within the
Christian majority. Finally, rather than delineating all that is
wrong with the separation of church and state, writers, academics, and citizens should develop solutions to the problem of
religious hegemony. Perhaps the best means of maintaining a
proper separation of church and state, without completely
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eliminating religion from political and social spheres, is to follow the Supreme Court’s neutral treatment of religion and nonreligion. By so doing, he who wishes to practice a faith according to his conscience may do so, irrespective of the
denomination or sect involved. That way, America truly can become a principled nation where religious diversity is not only
protected but encouraged.
Lindsay L. Welch

